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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARlVI MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
'
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
12300

vs.
RICHARD KAY and MYRTLE
L. KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT RICHARD KAY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by
the Appellant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
to avoid coverage under a policy of automobile liability
insurance issued to the Respondent Myrtle L. Kay of
any judgment obtained by the Respondent Richard Kay
against said Myrtle L. Kay for injuries and damages incurred as a result of a one car rollover on August 4,
1

1968. Appellant asserts its so-called "family and house-

hold" exclusion to liability coverage. Respondent Richard Kay asserts that Appellant is estopped from asserting said exclusion to liability coverage. Respondent
Richard Kay ambiguous and should be construed against
the Appellant, and that said exclusion is void as against
the public policy of the State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the Respondent's motions
for summary judgment, holding that Appellant was
estopped from asserting its so-called "family and household" exclusion in that the Respondent Myrtle Kay had
been prejudiced as a matter of law by Appellant's unconditional defense of Myrtle Kay in a suit brought by
Richard Kay for his injuries.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent Richard Kay seeks to have the
summary judgment in favor of Respondent and against
the Appellant affirmed.
OF FACTS
On August 4, 1968, a vehicle owned and driven by
the Respondent Myrtle L. Kay left the freeway and
struck a dirt pile near Spanish Fork, Utah. Richard
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Kay, the Respondent herein, was a passenger in said vehicle and suffered severe personal injuries and incurred
medical expenses in the approximate amount of $9,000.00, and other related expenses. Myrtle Kay is the mother
of Richard Kay. At the time of the incident, Richard
Kay was 35 years of age and was employed at Geneva
Steel Corporation as a Third Helper on the Open
Hearth. He had an arrangement with his mother by
which he would turn over to her his pay check, which
averaged $450.00 to $500.00 per month gross; (Myrtle
Kay deposition, P.12, L.7; Richard Kay deposition P.9,
L. 11) in return for her providing him with room and
board, transportation to and from work, and other normal and necessary living expenses. (Myrtle Kay deposition P.9, L.18-23; deposition of Richard Kay P.8, L.
21) The house is owned by Myrtle L. Kay, (lVIyrtle Kay
deposition P.13, L.l) and Richard Kay had lived in said
house for eleven years continuously since he returned
home from the Army. Myrtle L. Kay paid all of the
expenses in connection with buying and maintaining her
1965 Ford Galaxy automobile and in providing the
meals and other necessaries of room and board. (Richard
Kay deposition P.28, L.16-22)
On the day of the accident, Myrtle L. Kay was
transporting Richard Kay to Geneva in order for him to
report for work. (Myrtle Kay deposition P.17, L.10)
Richard Kay did not ever drive his mother's car. (Richard Kay deposition P.22, L.14) Appellant State Farm
Mutual had refused several years previously to afford
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liability insurance for him as a driver. (Richard Kay
deposition P.22, L.17)
Subsequent to the accident, H.ichard Kay, contacted his attorney Heber Grant Ivins who communicated
a claim against Myrtle L. Kay to her insurance carrier,
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. In response to
that claim one Vern M. Bowcutt Field Claims Representative for State Farm lVIutual wrote a letter to Mr.
Ivins on May 1, 1969 (R. 22), advising him that there
existed an exclusion in the policy, (Richard Kay deposition P .22) excluding from coverage claims by a person
who was an insured or who was a member of the family
of the insured residing in the same house as the insured.
Upon the insurance company's failure to recognize coverage and attempt settlement of the claim of Richard
Kay, he brought an action against Myrtle L. Kay in the
District Court of Utah County on or about the 15th day
of July, 1969. In response to said action, State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company undertook to defend without reservation or condition said action on behalf of
Myrtle L. Kay, and retained the law firm of Strong and
Hanni for the purpose.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company through
said attorneys filed an answer and proceeded to prepare
their case for trial, which included interviewing their
client, Myrtle L. Kay, (Myrtle Kay deposition P.31,
L.21) and obtaining her unconditional cooperation and
confidence, (Myrtle Kay deposition P.24, L.6-7; P.35,
L.8-10) taking the deposition of Richard Kay, and ob-
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taining pertinent medical information and other information pertaining to the expenses and loss of wages incurred by said Richard Kay. The case was set on October 9, 1969 for trial on January 12, 1970, and State
Farm and Richard Kay were prepared to go to trial.
Then, on October 23, 1969, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, through the same attorneys, Strong
and Hanni, brought the present Declaratory Judgment
action against their client and insured Myrtle L. Kay.
At no time prior to the Declaratory Judgment action did
Appellant advise Mrs. Kay that coverage would, or
would not be afforded. (l\ilyrtle Kay deposition P. 27)
Appellant State Farm has never obtained or attempted
to obtain a reservation of rights in regard to their obligation of coverage to Myrtle L. Kay under their policy of
insurance, nor at any time has State Farm or their attorneys attempted to withdraw as counsel for Myrtle L.
Kay, and in fact, at the present time are counsel of record for her in Case No. 33444, and counsel of record
against her, in the present case.

ARGUMENT I
THE APPELLANT STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY HAS WAIVED AND IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
ITS ALLEGED DEFENSE TO COVERAGE
INASMUCH AS IT POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ALLEGED DEFENSE AND
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NEVERTHELESS ASSU.lHED
UNCONDl'l'lONALLY AND WITHOUT RESERVATION
THE DEFENSE OF ITS INSURED
KAY IN THE ACTION BROUGHT HY THE
RESPONDENT RICHARD KAY AND
THEREAFTER CONDUCTED THE SAME
UNTIL THE PRESENT ACTION WAS INSTITUTED.
The issues regarding estoppel were treated in Appellant's brief in its arguments 1, 3, and 4. Respondent
replies to all of said points in the following argument .
.First, it should be noted that argwnent 1 in Appellant's
brief is a classic red herring. Appellant asserts therein
that at the time it assumed the defense of Myrtle Kay
and proceeded to conduct the same it had no knowledge
that Richard Kay was the son of Myrtle L. Kay. This
assertion is astounding in light of the letter received by
Heber Grant Ivins dated May 1, 1969, from Vern b-1.
Bowcutt, Field Claims Representative for the Appellant, which letter is reproduced herein on the following
page, as appendix A, and the fact that the Appellant had
been paying medical expenses for both Richard and
Myrtle Kay under its medical pay coverage. (Myrtle
Kay deposition P.21) It cannot be seriously said that
Appellant had no knowledge of its alleged defense under the family and household exclusion when said exclusion was specifically cited by Mr. Bowcutt in response
to Mr. Ivins' letter making claim in behaJf of Richard
Kay. The question is whether or not Appellant never-
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the less had a duty to unconditionally accept and conduct
the defense of Myrtle Kay where prior thereto it had
knowledge of facts which in its representative's judgment raised the family and household exclusion. The answer to that is obviously in the negative.
The general rule in this regard is stated in 38
A.L.R. 2d, page 1151:
" ... A liability insuror who asumes and conducts
the defense of an action brought against the insured with knowledge of facts taking the accident
or injury outside the coverage of the policy, and
without disclaiming liability or giving notice of
reservation of its rights to deny coverage, is thereafter precluded in an action upon the policy from
setting up the defense of noncoverage ...."
The annotation then cites thirty-two jurisdictions in support of that proposition. The rule is further elaborated
in 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance, Section 171,
page 503:
"If an automobile liability insuror assumes and
conducts the defense of an action brought against
the insured, with knowledge of facts taking the
accident or injury outside the coverage of the
policy, without disclaiming liability or giving notice of a reservation of its right to deny coverage,
such insuror is thereafter precluded on an action
upon the policy from setting up the defense of
noncoverage. In other words, the unconditional
defense of an action brought against its insured
generally constitutes a waiver of the terms of the
policy and an estoppel to defend on such grounds.
"
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APPENDIX "A"

A

IUtl IA.Ill

IMSUl&•Ctl

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Ho,.,•Offi"' eroominatoo.111;"'"

CLAIM SERVIC£ CENTER
363 NORTH UNIVERSITY A,;
P.O. BOX 170
PROVO, UTAH e460l

Heber Grant Ivans
Attorney at Law
E and I Building
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84003

Re:

Our Insured:
Our Claim #:
Date of Ace:
Your Client:

Myrtle Kay

44 230 9)0
8/4/68
Richard Kay

Dear Mr. Ivans:I am writing to you in regards to the letter directed to Myrtle L.

Kay on behalf of your client, Richard Kay,

We do have an exclusion in our policy that in essense is as follows:
"This insurance does not apply under coverage A bodily injury to any
inf'ured or any member of the family of an ini)ured residing in the
same household as the insured."
I will be more than happy to talk with you about this situation if
you desire. Please feel free to contact me at 37)-2652 or the
above address.
A-;; l:>efore mentioned, I will be more than happy to try to get together
with you eo that we can discuss this matter.

V!IB /pw
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The Utah Supreme Court has indicated in the two
following cases its adoption of this proposition. In Harding vs. Industrial Cornrnission of Ut(])h, 28 P 2d 182 83
Utah 376 ( 1934), the plaintiff was injured while hauling hay. The State Insurance Fund subsequent to Harding filing a claim for Workmen's Compensation paid
compensation and medical and hospital expenses resulting from said accident. When the claim finally came before the Industrial Commission for adjudication, the
Fund alleged that it offered no coverage to Harding inasmuch as the policy excluded agricultural work. In response to the State Fund's position, the plaintiff urged
that the Fund was estopped from asserting the defense
of non-liability under its policy having once assumed the
liability and paid compensation for a period of five years.
The facts showed that there was no deception or misrepresentation involved and that the Fund was well
aware of its defenses at the time that it made the payments. The Court, in discussing the elements that bring
the rule of estoppel into play stated as follows:
". . . There was no deception practiced by the
claimant, nor, so far as the record disclosed any
attempt to prevent full investigation. It may be
fairly assumed that the manager and claims adjusters of the fund were better informed as to the
terms and classifications of the policy, and
whether claimant was covered thereby, than
would be the claimant. He was informed by his
employer that he was protected by compensation
insurance. He was assured of this fact when compensation and hospitalization expenses were in
fact paid. If this had not been so, he would have
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had a right of action against his employer, which
he may have prosecuted with success. Whether he
would have succeeded or not, or whether his right
of action might not have been worth more or less
than he received from the state fund is immaterial.
It is enough that he had such a right which he
might have pursued in the courts if he cose to do
so.
"By lapse of time, the statute of limitations may
now be successfully urged against any such action and it is lost to him. His condition has
changed to his prejudice. He was lulled into a
sense of security and led to believe that he could
rely entirely on the State Insurance Fund for the
full coverage allowed by law for such injuries as
he suffered. Now he is told the insurance carrier
was mistaken in assuming liability, that he was
not covered by the policy, and the payments made
to him were a mere gratuity. The circumstances
are such that the State Insurance Fund is now
estopped to urge that the employee was not within the protection of the policy of insurance issued
by it to the Provo Brick and Tile Company.
"Somewhat analogous, and affording support to
the position we take, are the cases which hold that
where an employer's liability insurance carrier assumes the defense against the claim for damages,
even though it does not directly admit liability, as
was done in this case, the carrier is estopped to
deny liability that the employee was not covered
by the policy. Rieger vs. London Guarantee and
Accident Co., 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 SW 920:
Empire State Surety Co. vs. Pacific National
Labor Co., 200 S 225; Constitution lndemnit.1/
Co., vs. Beckham, 144 Ok. 81, 289 P 776; Royle
Min. Co., vs. Fidelity and Casualty Co., of New
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York, 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 SW 438; Humes
Construction Co., vs. Philadelphia Casualty Co.,
32 R. I. 246, 79 A 1.
The court then went on to hold that the rule of estoppel
applied and the State Fund was estopped from asserting
its defense to coverage. The court made this interesting
observation, in reply to a contention by the State Fund
fha t the doctrine of estoppel could not be used to extend
the terms of the policy:
". . . The doctrine of quasi estoppel is broad
enough to include such a result, and its application
is not restricted, as the defendant urges, to cases
where the conduct of the insuror precludes him
from insisting upon a foref eiture for the violation
of a condition contained in the policy. It is the nature of this principal to extend liability. It is not
invoked for the purpose of enforcing a true obligation or one that is clearly defined by the terms
of the contract. In this consideration, it is not material what the defendants real liability under the
policy was, where by its own election of positions
it is precluded from asserting that its liability was
not in accordance with its apparent admissions."
Supra, page 185.
In the case of Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 436
P. 2d 228, 20 Utah 2d 193 ( 1968) , the court held that
the insurance company waived its defense to coverage,
based upon the insured' s failure to pay a timely premium, by cashing and retaining the proceeds of a belated
premium check, a portion of which premium paid was
then still unearned. That case broadly stands for the

11

proposition that an insurance company may be barred
from asserting a substantial defense where it has taken
action inconsistent with the preservation and assertion of
such defenses.
It is clear from the foregoing cases that the Utah
law is contrary to the arguments raised in point 1 and 3
of Appellant's brief: The know ledge raising an estoppel
is not limited to the four corners of the complaint but
extends to all knowledge which the insurance company
obtains by its agents and investigators prior to acting on
a complaint, and the doctrine of estoppel clearly applies
to policy exclusions as well as grounds for forfeiture.

The only remaining issue regarding estoppel is
whether it is properly applicable in the present case. In
this regard Appellant questions whether or not Myrtle
Kay was prejudiced by the Appellant's unconditional
assumption and handling of her defense. It is interesting
to note the chronology of events herein: The accident
occurred August 4, 1968; Mr. Bowcutt' s letter to Heber
Grant Ivins acknowledging the alleged defense to coverage was dated May 1, 1969; Richard Kay filed his
complaint against Myrtle Kay on the 15th of July, 1969;
Appellant assumed the defense and an answer was filed
within 20 days thereafter; deposition of Richard Kay
was taken August 29, 1969; the Appellant filed a notice
of readiness for trial on the 18th of September, 1969,
and on October 9, 1969, the case was set by the court for
trial on January 12, 1970; on October 23, 1969, the Appellant filed the present Declaratory Judgment action
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an<l on August 27, 1970, the deposition of Myrtle Kay
was taken in the Declaratory Judgment action. The
ehronology does not support the conclusions made by the
Appellant that it had immediately proceeded to establish its policy defenses and take prompt action to deny
coverage as soon as proper proof was obtained. A more
believable conclusion is that the Appellant did not communicate its knowledge and information to its attorneys,
who proceded to defend this case with the vigor for which
they are noted, and that for unknown reasons it was not
until several months later after the case was set for trial
that the alleged policy defense was asserted. The Appellant denies that any prejudice could come to the Respondent Myrtle Kay as a result of Appellant undertaking her defense, supplying attorneys to her to whom
she looked as her defenders, and then after the case is
prepared and set for trial sue her to rid itself of those responsibilities. The law is clearly against such a conclusion. First of all it should be noted that many courts have
held that the insured' s loss of control over his defense is
alone sufficient prejudice and injury to activate the doctrine of estoppel. Such cases are the following:
In the case of Salerno vs. Western Casualty and
Surety Company, 336 F. 2d 14 (C. A. 8th, 1964), an
action was brought by the insurance company for declaratory judgment as to whether the policy afforded
coverage to a claim against Salerno. Salerno had a farm
on which he had horses. His insurance excluded coverage for injuries incurred while in the scope of his busi-
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ness. The claimant was a jockey who was injured while
riding a horse on the insured's farm. Immediately after
the accident occurred, the insurance company was given
notice, and the adjustor made his investigation and raise<l
the coverage question. However, the adjustor concluded
that the jockey was acting as an independent contractor,
and therefore the exclusion did not apply. Subsequently,
the jockey instituted an action against the insured in
which he alleged that he was a business invitee when injured. The insurance company accepted the defense,
without reservation, retained counsel, and undertook
complete control of the defense. Ten months after suit
was instituted, one of the insurance company's adj ustors
concluded that the exclusion did apply and then a declaratory judgment action was filed, the insurance company had not reserved any of its rights. In the meantime,
judgment had been granted in favor of the jockey and
against the insured in the amount of $23,500.00. The declaratory judgment action which had originally been
filed in the State Court was dismissed and a new declaratory judgment action was brought in the Federal
Court.
The Court of Appeals in dealing with the question
of estoppel stated the elements necessary for its application:
" ... Instead of relying on its right to reject for
noncoverage when a claim is first brought to its
attention, if, without due investigation, assumes
itself to be liable therefore and sets the insured
aside and claims the right of control of defense it
cannot afterward ignore the right the insured has
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acq_uired by reason of such action merely because
it has made a belated discoverey of fact, or law,
which it thinks puts the case outside the terms of
policy." Fairbanks Canning Co., vs. London
Guarantee and Accident Co., 154 Mo. App. 327,
133 SW 664 ( 1911). Supra, page 19.
The court held under the law of Missouri, that such
waiver or estoppel was irrevocable, especially where it
appeared that no facts were concealed from the insurance company by the insured, and the court held that the
insuror had sufficient knowledge within five days after
the accident to show that a business activity was being
conducted at the time of the accident. The court reversed
the judgment of the lower court for the insurance company and concluded as follows:
" ... Thus the conduct and knowledge of appellee
in assuming defense of the Humes claim cannot
be measured solely in the light of declarations
contained in the policy of insurance as was done
here. The original acceptance of coverage must
be viewed in the light of knowledge appellee had
of the true situation giving rise to Humes claim
as to which appellee was admittedly fully informed, when it accepted coverage and not 'because
(it) has made a belated discovery of facts or law
which (it) thinks puts the case outside the terms
of (its) policy.' "
The court also noted that it need not further concern itself with proof of damage since:
" ... The loss of a right to control. an? man3:ge
one's own case is itself a (the) preJ ud1ce, which
must be considered under the facts here." Supra
at 20 and 21.
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In Camire vs. Commercial Insurance Company,
198 A. 2d 168, (Maine) , the court estopped the insurance company from raising its policy defense, even
though the insured had perpetrated a fraud against the
insurance company in regard to his blameworthiness in
the accident. The court held that the insuror, by undertaking unconditionally the defense of the action, had
waived and was estopped from asserting that defense.
In regards to damages and prejudice, the court said on
page 175:
" ... 'fhe loss of the right to control and manage
one's own case is itself a prejudice.... "
The reason why the giving up one's defense is considered prejudicial is succinctly discussed in the case of
Ebert vs. Balter and Allstate Insurance Company, 83
N.J.S. 545, 200 A.2d 542. This was a unique case inasmuch as the insurance company undertook the defense
under a reservation of rights, however, did not assert the
basis for noncoverage until 31 months later. The court
held that even though there had been a reservation here,
substantial damage would occur to the insured where the
insurance company controls the defense and then subsequently denies coverage. The court said on page 441:
"Defense of a lawsuit carries with it definite responsibilities. The carrier's undertaking to defend
the insured may be greatly disadvantageous to
the insured if he must abandon control of the
claim to the company and yet be liable for any
judgment. As Chief Justice W einthraub wrote
in Merchants Indemnity Corporation of New
York vs. Eggleston, supra, control of the defense
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i_s vitally connected with the obligation to pay the
Judgment. Carriers contract for control and to
that end require notice of accident and prompt
submission of suit papers. Success, absolute or
depend upon skill and investigation,
m negotiat10n for settlement and in the conduct
of the lawsuit. Just as a carrier would -hardly
agree to pay a judgment after defense by the insured, so it cannot expect the insured to pay for a
judgment when it controlled the litigation. The
carrier may be more confident of its handling of
claims, but an insured may, with equal conviction,
prefer individualized attention of its own counsel
as against the services furnished by an insuror in
the mass handling of litigation. Personal counsel
may seize opportunities to settle which might be
ignored or overlooked by a carrier to which the
case is just one of a great number. Moreover,
whatever his estimate of lawyers in general, men
usually have faith in my lawyer. This intangible
is a valuable right."
Other cases to the same effect are as follows: Calverie vs. American Casualty Company, 76 F.2d 570
( 1935, C.A. 4th, North Carolina), Cert. Denied, 296
U.S. 590, 80 L.Ed. 417, and 56 S. Ct. 102; Lincoln

Parks Arms Building Corp., vs. United States Fidelity
Guaranty Co., 287 Ill. App. 520, 5 NE. 2d 773
(1936); American Casualty Co., vs. Shely, 314 Ky. 80,
234 SW.2d 303 (1950); Ziegler vs. Ryan, 66 S.Dak.
491, 285 NW 875 (1939); Beatty vs. Empwyers Liability Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 25, 168 A 919; Reese vs.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 163 N.Y.S. 2d
326 (1956).
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other courts, however, have gone even further
and have not required a factual showing of prejudice but
have presumed as a matter of law prejudice to the insured when the insurance company takes over the control and conduc"'" of the defense and subsequently attempts to disclaim coverage. A sampling of these cases
are as follows: In Merchants Indemnity Corp., vs. Eggleston, 179 A.2d 505, 37 N.J. 114 (1962), the insurance company brought a declaratory judgment action
against its insured to have the court declare that the insurance company would not be responsible for any judgment action filed against the insured nine months after
the facts had been in its possession upon which it based
its denial. The declaratory judgment action was brought
before the liability action had gone to trial, although it
had been pretried and was awaiting trial.
The court discussed the use of a summary j udgment by the insurance company to effect a disclaimer:
"We have no doubt that
was alreadv
barred from disclaimer from what had already
transpired (as to which we shall presently say
more), but we cannot agree that a carrier may
claim the right to defense and escape the consequences by filing a suit for declaration of its duty.
"We find no cases holding that the filing of a
complaint for a declaratory judgment will preserve a right to disclaim .... "
The court then took up the question of what prejudice
or detriment was required for the estoppel to arise. The
court held on page 512:
" ... In sum, proof of prejudice seems to be re-
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Most courts, however, find prejudice is
meyita?le when the insured is denied the right to
mamtam complete control of the defense of the
damage action. 29 (a) Am. J ur. Insurance, Section 466, page 569; 5 (a) Am. J ur., Automobile
Insurance, Section 133, page 134; 45 C.J.S., Insurance, Section 714, page 689; 7 (a) Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice (1962), Section
4693, page 535; Annotation 81 A.L.R. (1932),
1326, 1358; Annotation 38 A.L.R. 2d (1954),
1148, 1160. Indeed some courts speak of a conclusive presumption of prejudice, doubtless because, since the course cannot be re-run they believe it futile to attempt to prove or disprove that
the insured would have fared better on his own.
"In our state, a number of cases have dealt with
estoppel to deny coverage. In O'Dowd vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 117 N.J.L.
444, 451-452, 189 A 97 (1937), it was flatly said
that prejudice is beside the point...."
In regards to estoppel in general, the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of Rice vs. Granite School
District, 23 Utah. 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), in a discussion of the estoppel of an insurance company under
the Governmental Immunities Act, referred to a California case and adopted its language as follows:
" ... To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough
if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his
power, by which he might have retrieved
position and saved himself from loss .... It 1s well
settled that a person by his conduct may be
estopped to rely upon these defenses, where the
delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defense ...."
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I

It is obvious that l\fyrtle L. Kay was induced to refrain from undertaking her own defense by the unconditional assumption of the defense by State Farm.

I

I
I

In Pendelton vs. Pan A,merican Fire and Casualty
Company, 317 F.2d 96 ( 1963, 10th Cir., N.M.), an action by an insured against his insurance company to recover under a comprehensive liability policy, the policy
contained an endorsement purporting to exclude coverage for the distribution of liquified petroleum gas. An
explosion occurred on the insured' s place of business, resulting in the death of two persons. The insurance company sent the insured to see an attorney who was employed by the insurance company. The insured had six
actions brought against him arising from the explosion.
It was decided by the attorney that it would be better to
have separate counsel for the insured and thus another
attorney entered an appearance. The cases were finally
settled for $151,000.00. Two policies had been issued,
one of which had a limit of $25,000.00 and the other a
much higher limit. When the settlement was finally
made, the insurance company paid $25,000.00 and the
insured paid $126,000.00. The second attorney retained
for him by the insurance company did nothing to prevent the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions in
the settlement which were detrimental to him in regards
to the question of coverage. The facts also showed that
the exact coverage situation was always in flux during
the period of negotiations and the settlement. When the
insuror then refused to assume liability under the larger
policy, the insured brought this action. The basis of the
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action was that the insuror was estopped from denying
coverage since it had assumed the defense of the actions
and had completely controlled and directed the defense
up to the eve of the settlement, all without a reservation
of rights or disclaimer of liability. The court stated on
page 99:
"At the outset, we think this case is controlled by
the long established rule that a liability insurance
carrier which assumes and conducts the defense
of an action brought against its insured with
knowledge of a ground of forfeiture or noncoverage under the policy, and without disclaiming liability or giving notice of a reservation of its right
to deny coverage, is thereafter precluded in an
action upon the policy of setting up a ground of
forfeiture for noncoverage as a defense. In other
words, the insuror' s unconditional defense of an
action brought against its insured constitutes a
waiver of the terms of the policy and an estoppel
of the
,, insuror to assert the defense of noncoverage.
Supporting that statement the court cited various cases,
one of which is New Jersey Fidelity and Plate Glass Insurance Company vs. McGillia, 42 F.2d 789 (10th Cir.).
In regards to damage or prejudice, the court said
on page 99:
"Indeed, by the weight of authority, it is not necessary for the insured to show prejudice in such a
situation because he is presumed to have been
prejudiced by ,yirtue of his insuror's assumption
of the defense.
And in support of that presumption of prejudice, the
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court cited: Traders and General Insurance Co., vs.
Rubeo Oil and GM Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir.),
wherein Judge Morrell on page 627 said:
"The right to control the litigation and all of its
aspects carries with it the correlative duty to exercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, honest
and conscientious fidelity to the common interest
of the parties .... When the insuror undertakes
the defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent
of its insured in virtue of the contract of insurance
between the parties, and when a conflict of interest arises between the insuror, as agent, and assured, as principal, the insuror's conduct will be
subject to closer scrutiny than that of the ordinary agent because of his adverse interest .... "
The court concluded:
" ... The insuror after making a thorough investigation of the explosion and with full knowledge
of the contents of the insurance policy, including
the endorsements attached thereto of the charges
of negligence against Pendleton, in the state
court suits, undertook to, and did, assume complete control of his defense in those suits. It did
not at any time notify appellant that it was reserving the right to later contest coverage and
made no attempt to make a nonwaiver agreement
with him. By this conduct of the insuror, appellant was induced to, and did, relinquish control of
his defense in the suits to the insured. Thus, this
situation falls within the rule of estoppel by conduct as set forth in Porter vs. Butte Farmers
Mutual Insurance Co., 68 N.M. 175, 360 P.2d
372, where it was said:
'Estoppel by conduct arises where a party has
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been induced by the conduct of another to do or
or
forebear doing something he would not
would have done but for such conduct; when disadvantage results from such forebearance of action.'
"Moreover, it has been held that the insuror's
conduct in the type of situation we have here operates as an estoppel to later contest an action
upon the policy even though the facts may have
been within the knowledge of the insuror. Tozer
vs. Ocean .Accident and Guarantee Corp., 94
Minn. 478, 103 N.W. 509; Humes Construction
Co., vs. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 32 R.I. 246,
79 A 1. We conclude that the insuror is estopped
to now deny liability upon the insurance policy in
question." Pages 100-101.
See Tomerling vs. Canadian Indemnity Co., 394
P.2d 571, (Calif., 1964}, where the insurance company
entered its defense with a reservation of rights; however,
during the pendency of the proceedings the insurance
company's attorney advised the insured attorney that
they were dropping their reservation of rights and would
extend unconditional coverage. The insured's attorney
withdrew from the case and the insurance company's attorney proceeded to defend the action. Upon judgment
being entered, the insurance company denied coverage
and in regard thereto the court held that prejudice was
obvious and the insurance company was estopped from
asserting its coverage defenses.
The following cases have also held that prejudice
is presumed: General Tire Co., vs. Standard .Accident
Insurance Co., 65 S.2d 237, (1933, C.A. 8th, Minn.);
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Lincoln Parks Arms Building Corp., vs. United States
Jl'idelity and Guaranty Co., 287 Ill. App. 520, 5 NE2d
773 (1936); Security Insurance Co., vs. Jay, 109 F.Supp. 87 (recognizing rule) ; Schmidt vs.National Auto
Casualty Insurance Co., 207 F.2d 301, ( 1953, C.A. 8th,
Mo); Consolidated Electric Co-op vs. Employers Mutual Liability lns1trance Co., 106 F. Supp. 322, ( 1952,
D.C. Mo.); Kearns Coal Corp., vs. United Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 118 F.2d 33 (C.A. 2d, N.Y.), Cert. denied; 313 U.S. 579, 85 L.Ed. 1536, 61 S.Ct. 1099, and
See Moore Construction Co., vs. United Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 293 N.Y. 119, 56 N.E. 2d 74; Pendleton
vs. Pan American Fire and Casualty Co., 317 F.2d 96
(C.A. 10th, N.M.); Fidelity and Casualty Co., vs. Riley, 380 F.2d 153 (C.A. 5th Georgia).
It is the obvious rule from the cited cases that prejudice is deemed established by an insurance company's
unconditional assumption and handling of its insured' s
defense and subsequent abandonment of the same.
Whether a court presumes prejudice or requires evidence
appears to be of little importance since the result is the
same, the assumption of the defense being sufficient evidence of prejudice. In this case, the Appellant having
knowledge of its alleged policy defense made no effort
to assert the same nor to defend under a reservation of
rights, instead it supplied to Mrs. Kay counsel, to be her
lawyer, who then prepared the case with full cooperation
and confidence from Mrs. Kay, took Richard Kay's deposition, and filed a notice of readiness for trial. It was
not until after the case was set down for trial that Mrs.
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Kay was advised by Appellant that she was on her own.

It cannot seriously be contended that Mrs. Kay did not
lose a valuable right in relinquishing her defense to the
Appellant and then receiving it back like a hot potato
months later. Respondent submits that the trial court
properly found prejudice to Mrs. Kay, reliance by her,
and accordingly estopped Appellant.
ARGUMENT II
THE "FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION" CLAUSE AS MORE PARTICULARLY SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S
POLICY OF INSURANCE, IS AMBIGUOUS
AND SHOULD BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE APPELLANT, AND UNDER
THE FACTS HEREIN WOULD NOT APPLY
TO RICHARD KAY.
In the case of Lawrence vs. Burke, 431 P.2d 302
( 1967, Arizona) , Burke, the insured, was insured with
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and his policy
contained the identical exclusion as contained in the present action. The insured, Burke, was involved in a one car
roll-over while driving an automobile in which were riding three minor children, one of which was the daughter
of Geraldine Lawrence, and the other two being the
grandchildren of Mrs. Lawrence. Burke at one time had
resided with Mrs. Lawrence after returning from the
Armed Services and Burke had married one of Mrs.
Lawrence's daughters and had lived for some time in
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rented living quarters of .l\ilrs. Lawrences home. At the
trme of the injury, however, Burke and his wife were
living in a home they had purchased some miles away
trom the Lawrence residence.
On the night preceding the accident, the .Burkes
with their children had stayed with lHrs. Lawrence, and
.l\iir. Burke and the children were driving from the Lawrence residence to the Lawrence store at the time of the
roll-over. An action was brought by the children against
Burke. Prior to the filing of the action, however, State
Farm lHutual had obtained a statement from Burke
which, however, did not clearly state his residence at the
time. The action was filed on April 21, 1960. In August
1960, an attorney retained by State Farm filed an Answer to the Complaint. In }\;lay of 1961, Mrs. Lawrence
gave State Farm a statement concerning the facts, and
fourteen days later, State Farm Mutual' s attorney petioned the court to allow him to withdraw on the grounds
that coverage excluded under the family and household
provision, a defense in the action. He withdrew and a
default was taken in January of 1963, and efforts were
then made to collect the judgment from State Farm
which then moved to set aside the default judgment. The
minor children appealed from the order allowing State
Farm to intervene and vacating of the default judgment.
The court was faced with the question of the validity of
the exclusion. In that regard, the court said on page 309:
"In our opinion, the language set forth in exclusion (g) is ambiguous. In the case of State Fann
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., vs. Thomp-
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son, cited in 1967 by the United States Court of
Appeals, 9th Circuit and reported in 372 :F.2d
256, the identical policy language was under consideration. We recognize that the factual problem presented to the court was quite different
from the one before us. We agree, however, with
the statement of the court, (page 258) :
'The term family which is not defined in the
policy is at best imprecise and having in view the
possible meanings which may be given to it may
fairly be said to be ambiguous.' "
It should also be noted that the court stated that if State
Farm wanted to protect itself when called upon to enter
the defense it should have done so with a reservation of
rights or a declaratory judgment action before conducting the defense.

And in State Farm Mutual vs. Thompson, supra,
the Appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company denied coverage on the family and household exclusion. The claimant had married the insured in
Mexico, they had lived together, eaten together, and had
had sexual relations together, and while she was riding
with the insured was injured. Shortly after the injury,
she discovered that they had really not been married in
Mexico and she had not known it since she was intoxicated at the time. The court held in regard to the validity
of the exclusion:

" ... The term family, which is not defined in the
policy, is at best imprecise and
in view the
possible meanings which may be given to it, may
fairly be said to be ambiguous .... " Supra, page
258.
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"The obvious purpose of a family exclusions
clause is to exempt the insuror from liability to
those persons to whom the insured on account of
close ties would be apt to be partial in case of in.

. ...."
JUry

The court then went on to state the words "fmnily" au<l
"household" should be given that meaning which they
ordinarily would have in order to effectuate the purpose
of the exclusion and held that the exclusion did not encompass the claimant.
In the present case, the term "family" is not define<l
in the policy. It is ambiguous and should be construed
strictly against State Farm thereby excluding from its
scope an emancipated son of 35 years of age who was
paying for room and board, transportation, and other
services rendered to him by his mother as a boarder.
Such conclusion also is demanded by the law and public
policy of the State of Utah. The Utah State Legislature
in passing the Safety Responsibility Act, and in particular Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Ann. ( 1933), authoriz·
ing the Financial Responsibility Department to require
security in proper cases, saw fit to provide in said Act
that a driver should not be required to deposit security
where the person injured was his spouse or minor child.
The obvious purpose for this exclusion in the Act is that
in the State of Utah an action cannot be filed by one
spouse against another or by a minor child against his
parent. An emancipated child under the Safety Re·
sponsibility Act is categorized in the same class as all
other persons other than the driver's minor children and
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spouse. Accordingly, Myrtle Kay is subject to the requirements of the Safety Responsibility Act in regards
to a claim by Richard Kay, and if no insurance were applicable, she would have to come forth with sufficient
proof of Financial Responsibility.
Inasmuch as the term "family" in the exclusion is
ambiguous, it should be construed strictly and in a manner consistent with the Safety Responsibility Act, thereby excluding from coverage only the claims of the driver's spouse and minor children and not an emancipated
son boarding with the insured.

ARGUMENT III
THE APPELLANT'S "FAMILY AND
HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION" CLAUSE IS
VOID AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY
ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS ARBITRARY
AND HAS NO VALID PURPOSE UNDER

LAW.

The Appellant argues that the purpose of its exclusion is to protect against collusion between the insured and the claimant because of the family relationship; however, this is not justifiable. The policy contains
a "Cooperation Clause" which provides that the insured
must cooperate fully with the insurance company in prosecuting the defense and should there be any collusion between the insured and the claimant the insurance company may validly assert its rights thereunder for appro-
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priate remedy for noncooperation to wit, denial of cover.•·
age. It is obvious that there is no valid purpose for the·
exclusion clause other than to arbitrarily eliminate claims I
against the insurance company. Such exclusion makes no;
more sense than excludmg, for example, all persons with·
red hair. Respondent respectfully submits that such ex·
clusion is contrary to the public policy of the State of
Utah and should be held void and unenforceable.
•

I

CONCLUSION
The Appellant having accepted and conducted
Mrs. Kay's defense with full knowledge of the circumstances was properly estopped by the trial court from
now attempting to assert its family and household exclu·
sion in order to relieve itself of such defense to the obvious detriment of Mrs. Kay. In all regards, the decision
of the trial court was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Delbert M. Draper, Jr.,
Heber Grant Ivins, and
W. Brent Wilcox
Attorneys for Respondent
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